Imperfect quality information in a quality-competitive hospital market by Hugh Gravelle & Peter Sivey
Imperfect quality information in a
quality-competitive hospital market
Hugh Gravelle￿y Peter Siveyz
26 February
Revised version 15 October 2009
Abstract
We examine the implications of policies to improve information
about the qualities of pro￿t seeking duopoly hospitals which face the
same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if the
hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases
the quality of both hospitals. However if the costs are su¢ ciently dif-
ferent improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals.
Keywords: Uncertain quality. Information. Competition. Hospitals.
JEL numbers: I11, I18, L51
￿National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, Centre for Health Eco-
nomics, University of York. Email: hg8@york.ac.uk.
yNPCRCD receives funding from the Department of Health. The views expressed are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the DH. We are grateful for comments
from Pau Olivella, Luigi Siciliani and participants in the European Health Economics
Workshop, Lisbon May 2009.
zMelbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Mel-
bourne. Email: psivey@unimelb.edu.au1 Introduction
There is an increasing trend to in countries with public health care systems to
increase the choice available to patients (Department of Health, 2005; Vrang-
baek and Ostergren, 2006). In the UK National Health Service (NHS), where
general practitioners act as gatekeepers for elective (non-emergency hospital
care), the Department of Health has required that patients must be o⁄ered a
choice of hospitals when they are referred by their general practitioner. As an
integral part of its policy the Department of Health has introduced measures
to increase the information about hospitals available to patients and GPs.
Practices have been provided with software to provide information to pa-
tients on local hospitals. The Healthcare Commission, which regulates NHS
hospitals actively publicises its website which has comparative information
on the quality of hospitals. The website has information on rates of postop-
erative mortality, hospital acquired infections, and readmission rates.1 The
Netherlands2 also has a ￿Kiesbeter￿(￿Choose better￿ ) website with similar
information.
In these public systems hospitals are paid on a per case basis with cen-
trally regulated prices. The intention is that since hospitals cannot compete
via prices they will focus on quality improvement as a means of increasing
market share . A major justi￿cation of policy initiatives to improve the in-
formation about quality of hospitals is that better information will increase
the incentives for hospitals to raise quality.
We examine the argument that better information about hospital quality
will increase quality levels. We use a duopoly model in which two public
funded pro￿t-seeking hospitals face the same ￿xed price per case treated and
compete for patients via the quality of services they o⁄er. Patients receive
an imperfect signal about the quality of services at each hospital which they
use to inform choice of hospital. Hospitals di⁄er in their costs of producing
quality. In equilibrium the e⁄ect of increasing information on hospitals￿
quality levels depends on the di⁄erence between their quality cost parameters.
When quality costs are similar improved information increases quality at
both hospitals. However, if quality cost functions di⁄er su¢ ciently improved
information will reduce quality at both hospitals. We also show that whether
improved information makes patients better o⁄depends crucially on whether
one takes an ex ante or ex post view of patient utility.
1Healthcare Commission website address
2Netherlands website address
11.1 Related literature
There is an extensive literature discussing consumers imperfect information
on price (Salop, 1976) and price and quality (Schwartz and Wilde, 1985;
Chan and Leland, 1982) in monopolistic competition. This literature char-
acterises imperfect information by the search costs of consumers in ￿nding
a ￿rms￿price/quality. Instead, we have costless but imperfect information
with imprecise information signals.
A model more closely related to ours, including imperfect information
signals, is Dranove and Sattwerthwaite (1992). Their model includes vertical
and horizontal di⁄erentiation and consumers search sequentially through mo-
nopolistically competitive ￿rms. Firms compete on price as well as quality.
In contrast, we analyse quality-only competition in a duopoly, and allow for
di⁄ering quality production technology across hospitals. In the Dranove and
Satterthwaite model holding the level of information about price constant,
improved quality information always increases equilibrium quality. In our
model this is so only if hospitals have similar quality-producing technologies.
We use a random utility model for consumer choice which has some sim-
ilarities with the product di⁄erentiation literature (Perlo⁄ and Salop, 1985;
Wolinsky,1986; Anderson et al, 1995). In this literature the error term in the
consumer choice model is attributed to consumers taste di⁄erences. In con-
trast, we assume the error term in our model represents consumer imperfect
information.
There is a US empirical literature on the e⁄ect the e⁄ects of publicly
reported hospital, health plan and physician quality information (￿ report
cards￿ ) (Beaulieu, 2002; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003; Dranove et al, 2003; Cutler
et al, 2004; Zhe, 2006). Part of this literature investigates whether infor-
mation increases patient outcomes by selection of more healthy patients, by
matching severely ill patients with high quality providers (Dranove et al,
2003) or by improved quality through increased competition (Cutler et al,
2004).
We do not consider patient severity and selection. We concentrate on
the question of whether increased information increases competition between
hospitals, and hence hospital quality, and hence patient utility.
Monte￿ori (2005) considers consumer imperfect information about hos-
pital quality, assuming a normal distribution of consumer uncertainty about
quality and using a Taylor approximation in the analysis. The Taylor ap-
proximation constrains the model to consider ￿ bounded uncertainty￿about
hospital quality, where perceived hospital quality is ￿ very close￿to actual
quality. The accuracy of quality information signals di⁄ers between the two
￿rms, rather than the quality production technologies. Equilibrium hospital
2quality is only a⁄ected by the di⁄erence between the information about the
hospitals quality. Better information about the quality at one hospital re-
duces quality. This is because patients are risk-averse with respect to quality
and so will be willing to accept lower mean quality if it is less uncertain. By
contrast, in our model such risk-aversion can play no role as there is same the
degree of uncertainty about quality at both hospitals. Information a⁄ects
the demand response to quality changes and we ￿nd that increasing infor-




There are two hospitals H;L with quality levels qH;qL ￿ 0. All patients
consume one unit of hospital care, so that the total demand for the two
hospitals is constant. Hospital quality only in￿ uences the choice of hospital.
Patients obtain imperfect information about hospital quality from pri-
mary care physicians￿recommendations, their own past experiences, past
experiences of friends and families, and from publicly provided websites. A
patient observes a quality signal ^ qjfor hospital j









The errors "j have uniform distributions and zero means. The errors in a
patient￿ s signals about the two hospitals are independent, as are the errors in
di⁄erent patients￿signals about a hospital. v > 0 measures the precision of
the signal3 and increases in v improve the accuracy of patient observations.
A patient has no prior information about hospital quality and so her
expectation of hospital quality after receiving information on quality is4
E[qHj^ qH] = ^ qH (2)
3The variance of the error distribution is 1
12v2.
4We could assume that there is a minimum level of quality qo > 1=v with the hospitals
incurring costs to increase quality above the minimum. This would avoid the case in which
some patients￿expectations of quality at a hospital are negative when qj < 1=v. However
this would clutter the notation and make no di⁄erence to our results concerning the e⁄ect
of improved information (larger v) on hospital choice of quality or on welfare.
32.2 Demand
Patient utility is strictly increasing in hospital quality which is the only
characteristic of hospitals that a⁄ects utility.5 Thus the patient will choose
hospital H rather than L i⁄ ^ qH ￿ ^ qL. The mass of patients is 1 so that the
demand for hospital H is the probability that a patient observes that quality
in H is at least as high as in L
D
H(qH;qL) = Pr[^ qH ￿ ^ qL = Pr["L ￿ "H ￿ qH ￿ qL) (3)
Since the di⁄erence between two uniformly distributed variables is has a
triangular distribution, demand for hospital H is the distribution function of
a triangle distribution (see the Appendix for a derivation).
The properties of DH (and analogously for hospital L) are shown in Table
1.
Table 1. Demand for hospital H
qH 2 [0;qL ￿ 1
v] [qL ￿ 1
v;qL] [qL;qL + 1





qH ￿ qL + 1
v
￿2 1 ￿ v2
2
￿




H 0 v + v2(qH ￿ qL) v ￿ v2(qH ￿ qL) 0
DH
HH 0 v2 ￿v2 0
DH
v 0 DH
v < 0 DH
v > 0 0
DH
L 0 ￿v2 ￿
qH ￿ qL + 1
v
￿
> 0 ￿v2 ￿









L are continuous for qH ￿ 0
Demand is non-decreasing in own quality and non-increasing in the qual-
ity of the other hospital. The demand function is convex in own quality when
H has lower quality than L and concave when it has higher quality. Figure 1
illustrates. The demand function would have a similar shape for other sym-
metric error distributions, such as the normal and logistic distributions. The
triangle distribution is more tractable than these alternatives. Note from the
last row of Table 1 that more precise information reduces demand for the
lower quality hospital and increases it for the higher quality hospital.
2.3 Hospitals








j; j = H;L (4)
5In general, the hospital market is horizontally as well as vertically di⁄erentiated. We
extend the model to consider horizontal and vertical di⁄erentiation in section 4.
4We assume that quality is a public good for the patients of a hospital, as in
Gravelle and Masiero (2000) and Brekke et al (2006). The hospital incurs
the same cost to achieve a given level of quality irrespective of the num-
ber of patients treated. Examples include investment in sta⁄ training and
information systems.
The hospitals may have di⁄erent costs of quality. Without loss of gener-
ality we assume that ￿L ￿ ￿H > 0. (The subscripts are mnenomics for the
quality of the hospitals, not their quality costs: hospital H will turn out to
be the higher quality hospital in equilibrium.)
Pro￿ts for hospital j are
￿






j; j = H;L (5)
The regulated price p is the same for both hospitals. We assume that hospital
managers choose quality to maximise pro￿ts. If the hospitals are in public
ownership this may because future pay or professional reputation is linked to
pro￿t. We discuss the implications of public and private ownership in section
3.
2.4 Nash equilibrium in qualities
The ￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximisation for hospital H are
￿
H
H = (p ￿ c)D
H
H ￿ ￿HqH ￿ 0; qH ￿ 0; ￿
H
HqH = 0 (6)
and analogously for hospital L. The ￿rst term (p￿c)DH
H is the marginal net
revenue from increasing quality: the increase in demand multiplied by the
net pro￿t per unit sold.
Although the quality cost function is convex, the pro￿t function is not
concave in own quality because of the non-concavity of the demand function
DH in own quality. Thus (6) is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for
pro￿t maximisation. ￿H
H = 0 may be satis￿ed at a local minimum and even
when it is satis￿ed at a local maximum, the hospital may be making a loss
and would do better with zero quality.
Consider Figure 2 which shows the e⁄ect on the pro￿t maximising qH
of increases in qL . Each triangular curve show the marginal net revenue
(p ￿ c)DH
H from qH for a given level of qL. From Table 1, for given qL,
(p ￿ c)DH
H is increasing in qH and has slope (p ￿ c)DH
HH = (p ￿ c)v2 when
qH < qL and is decreasing in qH and has slope (p ￿ c)DH
HH = ￿(p ￿ c)v2
when qH > qL. The marginal net revenue triangles are further to the right
for higher levels of qL. Thus in the Figure 0 = q0
L < q1
L < :::: < q7
L.
5The global pro￿t maximising quality which satis￿es (6) depends on the
quality cost parameter ￿
H. We can distinguish 2 cases.
Case (a).Hospital H has high marginal cost of quality in that
￿
H ￿ (p ￿ c)v
2 ￿ ￿
o (7)
(i) When ￿H > ￿
o hospital H marginal cost curve will be steeper than the
upward sloping portion of its marginal net revenue curve. Any q￿
H satisfying
￿H
H = 0 also satis￿es the second order condition. Thus if q￿
H > qL (as when
qL = q0




HH = (p ￿ c)D
H
HH ￿ ￿H = (p ￿ c)v
2 ￿ ￿H < (p ￿ c)v
2 ￿ ￿
o = 0 (8)
and if q￿




HH = (p ￿ c)D
H
HH ￿ ￿H = (p ￿ c)(￿v
2) ￿ ￿H < 0 (9)
Thus any q￿
H satisfying ￿H
H = 0 is a local maximum.
At qH = qL, ￿H
HH is discontinuous but it is obvious from Figure 2 that
q￿
H = qL = q2
L is a local pro￿t maximiser since the marginal cost curve ￿
a
HqH
cuts the net marginal revenue curve from below.
It is also apparent from Figure 2 that pro￿t is positive at any q￿
H satisfying
the ￿rst order condition, since the area under the marginal cost curve is
always less than the area under the net marginal revenue curve. Hence such
q￿
H are also global optima. Finally, we see that if qL ￿ 1=v then the optimal
q￿
H = 0.
(ii) When ￿H = ￿
o the second order condition is satis￿ed at q￿
H satisfying
￿H
H = 0 for q￿
H > qL. When qL = 1=v the marginal cost curve coincides with
the net marginal curve and pro￿t is zero for all qH 2 [0;qL]. We assume that
hospital mangers are lexicographically altruistic (if pro￿t is una⁄ected they
prefer to care for more patients rather than less) so that the hospital sets
q￿
H = qL = 1=v. When qL > 1=v, pro￿t is maximised at zero quality.
Figure 2 shows that as qL increases from zero the optimal q￿
H is initially
increasing as H moves up its marginal cost curve from a0, to a1 and then




HqH = (p ￿ c)DH
H = (p ￿ c)v so that q￿
H is
increasing with qL up to qL = (p ￿ c)v=￿H. Further increases in qL move H




6Thus if ￿H ￿ ￿




(p ￿ c)(v + v2qL)
￿H + v2(p ￿ c)
; qL 2 [0;(p ￿ c)v=￿H]
=
(p ￿ c)(v ￿ v2qL)
￿H ￿ v2(p ￿ c)
; qL 2 [(p ￿ c)v=￿H;1=v]
= 0; qL ￿ 1=v (10)
The reaction function is illustrated in Figure 2. Its intercept rH
a (0;￿H) on
the qH axis is at or below 1
2v since ￿H ￿ ￿
o = (p ￿ c)v2 and its intercept on
the qL axis is at 1
v. When ￿H = ￿




2v and increases with qL to 1
v at the 45o line and jumps downward to
zero for qL > 1
v.
Case (b). Now suppose that ￿H < ￿
o. From Figure 2 we see that when





o cuts the marginal net
pro￿t curve once from below and so any q￿
H satisfying the ￿rst order condition
is both a local and global pro￿t maximiser. When qL > 1=v (as when qL
= q5
L, qL = q6
L or qL = q7
L) the marginal cost curve cuts the net marginal
revenue curve twice. The second order condition is satis￿ed only on the
downward sloping part of the net marginal revenue curve where q￿
H > qL.
For qL close to 1=v, the q￿
H satisfying the ￿rst and second order conditions
is also a global maximiser since the area under the marginal cost curve is less
than the area under the marginal net pro￿t curve. But, as qL increases
the area under the marginal cost curve up to q￿
H increases whereas the area
under the triangular net at the optimal point decrease. Hence when ￿H < ￿
o
there exists a ^ qL such that the pro￿t at the solution satisfying the ￿rst and
second order conditions is negative for qL > ^ qL. Hence the optimal q￿
H = 0
when qL > ^ qL. In Figure 2 ^ qL = q6
L. As qL increases hospital H moves
up its marginal cost curve ￿
b
HqH from b0 (when qL = 0) to b1;:::;b5 until
b6 where q6
L = ^ qL. When qL = q7
L > ^ qL, b7 satis￿es the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for a local maximum but pro￿t is negative and the global
maximum is at zero quality.
Thus in case (b) where ￿H < ￿




(p ￿ c)(v + v2qL)
￿H + v2(p ￿ c)
; qL 2 [0; ^ qL]
= 0; qL ￿ ^ qL (11)
In Figure 3 the reaction function has an intercept rH
b (0;￿H) between 1
2v and
1
v on the qH axis and is upward sloping until qL = ^ q where it jumps downward
to zero.
7Hospital L has the analogous reaction functions and Figure 4 plots the
case (a) and (b) reaction functions for both hospitals. If both hospitals have a
low cost parameter (￿H, ￿L < ￿
o) then the reaction functions are rH
b (qL;￿H);
rL
b (qH;￿L) and there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies because the
reaction functions do not intersect.
Since without loss of generality we have assumed ￿H ￿ ￿L, there are three
types of Nash equilibria. First, when the cost parameters are ￿H = ￿L = ￿
o,
there is a Nash equilibrium (not shown) on the 45o line at qH = qL = 1
v if
both hospitals prefer to produce a positive quality rather than no quality
when both qualities yield the same pro￿t. However this equilibrium is not
robust to small downward perturbations in one of the cost parameters.
Second, when ￿H ￿ ￿
o < ￿L, there is an equilibrium at NEba above the
45o line where rH
b (qL;￿H) = rL
a(qH;￿L). Third, when ￿
o < ￿H ￿ ￿L, the
equilibrium is at NEaa on or above the 45o where rH
a (qL;￿H) = rL
a(qH;￿L).
Su¢ cient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium are (Dixit, 1986)
0 > ￿
j













jj = (p ￿ c)D
j
jj ￿ ￿j; j = H;L (14)
￿
H




LH = (p ￿ c)D
L
LH (15)
The second order conditions ￿
j
jj < 0 for pro￿t maximisation are satis￿ed on
















= ￿H￿L + (p ￿ c)D
L
LL (￿L ￿ ￿H) > 0
since ￿L ￿ ￿H > 0 and so the second and third types of Nash equilibria are
stable.
The reaction function for hospital H has the same form above the 45o
whether the Nash equilibrium is NEba or NEaa. Hence solving the reaction
functions we have
Proposition 1 There is a unique stable Nash equilibrium if and only if ￿L >
￿














￿H￿L + v2(p ￿ c)(￿L ￿ ￿H)
(17)














Notice that the relationship between the Nash equilibrium qualities must














Di⁄erentiation of (16) and (17) yields the comparative static properties of
the Nash Equilibrium. We summarise the e⁄ects of changes in prices and
cost parameters in
Proposition 2 (i) The quality of both hospitals is increasing in the price
and decreasing in the unit cost of production (@q￿
j=@(p ￿ c) > 0; j = H;L)
and decreasing in each hospital￿ s own quality cost parameter (@q￿
j=@￿j < 0;
j = H;L).
(ii) When the quality cost parameters di⁄er (￿L > ￿H), the quality of hos-
pital H is decreasing in the quality cost parameter of hospital L (@q￿
H=@￿L < 0)
and hospital L quality is increasing in the quality cost parameter of hospital
H (@q￿
L=@￿H > 0).
The propositions can also be demonstrated diagrammatically by making
use of the fact that the equilibrium is de￿ned equivalently by either of the
reaction functions ((16) or (17)) and the ratio condition (19). Thus in Figure
5 the initial equilibrium is at NE0 where the two reaction functions and the
ratio condition locus intersect. The intersection of the reaction function rL
a
with the 45o line is at q = v(p ￿ c)=￿L. The ratio condition locus depends
only on the quality cost parameters. Thus an increase in (p￿c) will pivot rL
a
upwards (not shown) and shift the equilibrium up the ratio condition locus,
increasing both qH and qL.
Consider the slightly less intuitive result that changes in the other hos-
pital￿ s quality parameter have the opposite e⁄ects on q￿
H and q￿
L. Suppose
that ￿L increases, thereby increasing (￿L=￿H) to (￿L=￿H)0 and steepening the
9ratio condition locus. The increase in ￿L has no e⁄ect on rH
a so that equi-
librium shifts from NE0 to NE2. Hence increasing ￿L reduces both q￿
H and
q￿
L. Suppose instead that the initial ratio condition locus is (￿L=￿H)0 and
the equilibrium is at NE1. Now let ￿H increase, shifting the ratio condition
locus to (￿L=￿H). ￿H has no e⁄ect on rL
a and so the equilibrium shifts to NE0
from NE1. The increase in ￿L reduces q￿
L but increases q￿
H.
Our main interest is in the e⁄ect of better information (higher v). The
diagrammatic analysis is more complicated in this case because increases in
v shift the intercepts of both reaction curves on the vertical axis and the 45o
line. For example, the intercept of the rL
a reaction curve shifts down and the
intercept on the 45o line shifts up, so that the equilibrium could be shifted
up or down the ratio condition locus. Thus quality could be increased or
reduced by better information. Since the ratio condition locus is una⁄ected
by v we do know however that the hospitals qualities will move in the same
direction.
We establish
Proposition 3 (i) Improvement in information increase (reduce) the quality
of both hospitals i⁄ ￿H > (<) ^ ￿ ￿ ￿
o￿L=(￿
o + ￿L) where ￿
o = v2(p ￿ c).
(ii) Improvement in information increases the quality of both hospitals if
the quality cost parameter of the lower cost hospital is large enough: ￿H >
￿
o ) @q￿
j=@v > 0; j = H;L.
(iii) Improvement in information increases the quality of both hospitals if
the relative di⁄erence in the quality cost parameters is small enough: ￿H >
1
2￿L ) @q￿
j=@v > 0; j = H;L.
(iv) If ￿L > ￿H quality at both hospitals is maximised with respect to
information at v = ^ v ￿ f￿H￿L=[(￿L ￿ ￿H)(p ￿ c)]g
1
2 and is increasing in v
for v 2 (0; ^ v) and decreasing in v for v 2 (^ v;vo) where vo ￿ [￿L=(p ￿ c)]
1
2.
(v) If ￿L = ￿H quality at both hospitals is always increased by better
information for v 2 (0;vo).
Proof. Part (i) follows from the di⁄erentiation of (16) and (17) and the
de￿nition (7) of ￿
o. For part (ii) note that ^ ￿ is strictly increasing in ￿L and
lim￿L!1^ ￿ = ￿
o so that ￿H ￿ ￿
o implies ￿H ￿ ^ ￿.
For part (iii) refer to Figure 6 and note that lim￿L!￿o ^ ￿ = 1
2￿
o. The
derivative of ^ ￿ with respect to ￿L is [￿
o=(￿
o + ￿L)]2 which is decreasing in ￿L
and lim￿L!￿o d^ ￿=d￿L = 1




o) with slope 1
2 or equivalently 1
2￿L > ^ ￿.
For part (iv) substitute v2(p ￿ c) for ￿
o in the condition ￿H ? ^ ￿ ￿
￿
o￿L=(￿
o + ￿L) for q￿
j to increasing or decreasing in v. Part (v) follows from
substituting ￿H for ￿L in the de￿nition of ^ ￿.
10Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the quality cost parameters,
the existence of Nash Equilibrium and the e⁄ect of better information on
quality. By the assumption that ￿L ￿ ￿H and Proposition 1, there is a Nash
Equilibrium if and only if the quality cost parameters are in the region below
the 45o line and to the right of ￿
o. Better information increases quality in
the region above the ^ ￿ locus.
Figure 7 shows the e⁄ect of better information on quality for two cases.
In the ￿rst,an example of the quality cost con￿guration above the ^ ￿ locus
in Figure 6, an increase in v increases the qualities of both hospitals. The
second, where the relative di⁄erence (￿L=￿H) is much greater, is an example
of a cost con￿guration below the ^ ￿ locus in Figure 6.
To get some intuition for the conclusion that in some circumstances better
information leads to a reduction in quality note that the equilibrium can be
de￿ned by the interior pro￿t maximisation condition ￿H
H = 0 (6) for hospital
H and the fact that the equilibrium qualities are proportional qH￿H ￿qL￿L













(p ￿ c)v2(￿L ￿ ￿H)
(20)




sgn @qH=@v = sgn ￿
H
Hv = sgn D
H
Hv = sgn [1 ￿ 2v(qH ￿ qL)] (21)
Equilibrium quality decreases if and only if better information reduces the
marginal revenue from increasing quality.
Patients choose the hospital with the highest perceived quality. A pa-
tient￿ s choice is not a⁄ected by the magnitude of her perceived di⁄erence in
quality, only by its sign. Hence the demand for hospital H is the distribution
function DH = F(qH ￿ qL;v) = F(￿q;v). An increase in qH increases de-
mand for hospital H at the rate f(qH ￿qL;v). This density of the di⁄erence
in patient quality perceptions is unimodal with mode at ￿q = 0. An in-
crease in information v is equivalent to a mean preserving contraction in the
distribution, shifting probability mass from the tails to the centre, increasing
f near to ￿q = 0 and decreasing f when ￿q is su¢ ciently large.. Hence
when hospital H quality is similar to that of hospital L, an improvement
in information shifts up f(￿q;v) and increases its marginal revenue from
quality.
Figure 8 illustrates. As the ￿gure shows an increase in v steepens the
marginal revenue curve for the ￿rm and also shifts its intercepts on the
horizontal axis. Thus when qH is close to qL the marginal revenue curve
11is shifted up and optimal quality for hospital H increases. When qH and qL
are su¢ ciently di⁄erent the marginal revenue curve is shifted down and the
optimal quality for hospital H is reduced.
In the next section we make assumptions about the welfare function in
order to analyse the welfare implications of improvements in information.
However, even in the absence of a welfare function, Proposition 3 is policy
relevant in showing that improved information may not increase quality if
hospitals have su¢ ciently di⁄erent quality cost parameters.
Policy makers looking to encourage quality competition, may improve
the information consumers have about hospital quality. However, the model
suggests they should also ensure that hospitals have relatively equal access to
capital investment and labour markets for management and doctors, repre-
sented in the model by ￿H and ￿L to enable them to compete for patients on
quality. Where hospitals have very unequal resources for improving quality,
our model suggests that increasing information levels can reduce equilibrium
quality of both high and low quality hospitals.
3 Welfare
3.1 Average patient utility
Although patients care only about the quality of the hospital they choose:
u = maxfqH+"H;qL+"Lg,6 the welfare implications of improved information
depend crucially on whether one takes an ex ante or ex post view of welfare.








(qL + "L)f("L;v)f("H;v)d"Ld"H (22)
where the ￿rst part is expected utility from choosing hospital H (when qH +
"H ￿qL ￿ "L) and the second from choosing hospital L (when qH +"H ￿qL <
"L). Since "j is uniformly distributed on [￿1
2v ; 1
2v] ex ante expected patient

















6Patients either pay no price for care or they pay the same price whichever hospital
is chosen. In the latter case the welfare function would contain a term equal to the total
amount paid by patients multiplied by (￿ ￿ ￿). Since total demand is constant this term
has no bearing on the welfare analysis of information policy.
12where ￿q = qH ￿ qL.
Using the ex ante speci￿cation of expected patient utility in the welfare
function requires that we respect patient imperfect observations about quality
as well as their preferences. An alternative justi￿cation for the ex ante form
is that qj + "j re￿ ect variations in actual quality delivered to a patient at
hospital j. This requires a rather strained interpretation of increases in v
as due to a policy which reduces the amount of quality variation at both
hospitals. An example might be promulgation of best practice guidelines.










2 = DH (24)
and similarly for an increase in qL. An increase in quality at a hospital causes
some patients to change their choice of hospital. But these are the patients
who are indi⁄erent between the two hospitals given their observations of
quality and so they do not gain or lose from the small change in quality.
Thus the only e⁄ect of the quality increase is on the patients who choose
that hospital.





























DL > 0. This is intuitive: when quality di⁄ers better information improves
patient choices and one would expect the increase in patient utility to be
greater the larger is the di⁄erence in qualities.
Less intuitive is the contribution of the second term in (25) which reduces
the gain from better information and may make UA
v < 0. Indeed when there is
no di⁄erence in quality between the two hospitals better information reduces
expected utility. The rationale is that utility is maxfqH + "H;qL + "Lg. If
qH = qL = q, expected utility is q +E[maxf"H;"Lg] and the expected value




6v. This is smaller the higher is v: there is less chance that at
least one of the observations will exceed any speci￿ed value.
A simpler speci￿cation of average patient utility is that we ignore patient
errors in observing quality and evaluate the care they receive at its true















Using the fact that D
j
j = ￿Dk












H(qH ￿ qL) > 0 (27)











L(qH ￿ qL) (28)
When qH > qL increases in qj increase the utility of those who chose hospital
j and induce some patients to switch to hospital j from hospital k. If the
patients are switching to a higher quality hospital they gain ex post as well.
But if the patients switch from the high quality to the low quality hospital
then they are worse o⁄ ex post as result of the quality increase. With the
ex ante expected utility criterion increases in quality always raises patient
utility.







2[1 ￿ v￿q] ￿ 0 (29)
As a result of the better information patients switch from the lower to the
higher quality provider. This direct switching bene￿t from switching is de-
creasing in v as there are fewer patients at hospital L to switch to hospital
H information improves.
We summarise the implications of the ex ante and ex post views in
Proposition 4 Patients are always made better ex ante o⁄ by improvements
in quality but may be made worse o⁄ by improvements in information. Pa-
tients may be made worse o⁄ ex post by improvements in the quality of the
lower quality hospital but are never made worse o⁄ by improvements in in-
formation.
3.2 Welfare function
For the derivation and analysis of equilibrium hospital quality we assumed
that hospital managers aimed to maximise hospital pro￿t whether the hos-
pitals were public or privately owned. But in order to undertake welfare
14analysis it is necessary to specify hospital ownership ie who is the residual
claimant for their pro￿ts and losses. There are two possibilities compatible
with the analysis in the previous sections. Under private ownership the man-
agers act as perfect agents in maximising pro￿t for private owners. Under
public ownership the managers care about pro￿t for intrinsic reputational
reasons and the taxpayers are the residual claimants.
Remembering that total demand is ￿xed and normalised to 1, we specify


























k(qH;qL;v) ￿ ￿(p + g(v)) (30)
where Uk is either ex ante (k = A) or ex post (k = P) patient utility and g(v)
is the cost of improving information. ￿ is the welfare weight on hospital pro￿t,
￿ the welfare weight on expected patient utility and ￿(> 1) either measures
the shadow price of public funds or the welfare weight on taxpayers.7 To
characterise public ownership of hospitals we can set ￿ = ￿ and for private
ownership we would assume that a < ￿. Changes in v alter patients￿choices
of hospitals not their total demand for care. The welfare e⁄ects of improved
information arise from its e⁄ect on the total cost of producing quality and
patient utility. Hospital revenues and government expenditure do not depend
on the amount of information.
Policy makers potentially have two instruments: they can provide better
information about hospital quality (increase v) and they may be able to set
the price p. Both v and p can be used to in￿ uence hospital quality, but
information also has a direct e⁄ect on patient welfare at given quality levels
because it improves their decisions about which hospital to choose. The
policy rhetoric accompanying policies to improve information suggests that
policy makers want to use information to increase competition and thereby
drive up quality. This implies that policy makers do not regard price as
means of a⁄ecting quality. However, for the sake of completeness we derive
optimal conditions on information and price.
7We do not enquire about the nature of the contract between owners and managers
nor do we specify the relative welfare weights on private owners and mangers. If there is a
pro￿t sharing contract then the welfare weight on ￿rm pro￿t depends on the pro￿t share
and the relative welfare weights on owners and managers but since owner and manager
utility will be proportional to pro￿t we set the resulting mix of welfare weights and pro￿t
shares to ￿. If there is a forcing contract so that managers get a ￿xed salary but nothing
if they fail to maximise pro￿t, we can drop their constant utility from the welfare function.
15Recall from section 2.4 that if ￿L < v2(p￿c) there is no Nash equilibrium.
We therefore impose the constraint ￿L ￿ v2(p ￿ c) on the choice of policy
instruments.8 Writing the policy Lagrangean as W k +￿[￿L ￿v2(p ￿ c)],



















jp ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿v
2 = 0 (32)
where q￿
jv,q￿
jp are the partial derivatives of the equilibrium quality q￿
j with
respect to the information parameter and price.
If the hospitals have the same quality technologies so that ￿H = ￿L, and










0(v) = 0 (33)
Since UP
v = 0 > UA
v and q￿
v > 0; we see that the optimal quality will be
less than the ￿￿rst best￿q = ￿=2￿￿. Optimal quality will be lower under
public than under private ownership because the welfare weight on costs will
be less. The optimal level of information will be lower when the ex ante view
of patient welfare is taken. If hospitals have di⁄erent quality technologies it
is no longer possible to say whether information would be greater under the
ex post or ex ante view of patient utility.
Now suppose that health care policy makers can also control the price
paid to hospitals. Using (32) to solve for ￿Uk
qL ￿ ￿jq￿














































0(v) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
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8The comparative static properties were derived on the assumption that ￿L > v2(p￿c)
which was su¢ cient for a stable unique equilibrium. There is also an equilibrium with
￿L = ￿H = v2(p ￿ c) but it is not robust to small increases in v and p. We include
this equilibrium possibility in the welfare analayis to ensure that the feasible set is closed.
By assuming a su¢ ciently high marginal cost on information we can restrict attention to
equilibria where ￿L > v2(p ￿ c).
16If price is set optimally there are four e⁄ects of better information on welfare.
First, better information may make patients better o⁄. Second, better infor-
mation may have a marginal cost. Third, both information and price a⁄ect
quality. Under private ownership ￿ > ￿ and a lower price improves welfare
if quality ￿xed. Hence if better information increases quality it permits a
reduction in the price and thereby increases welfare in the case of private
hospitals. Finally, the last term is the gain in welfare from an increase in v if
v has, relative to p, a bigger e⁄ect on quality than in tighteing the constraint.
If hospitals are publicly owned and the constraint does not bind, then the
only policy relevant e⁄ects of information is its direct e⁄ect on patient utility
and its marginal cost.
4 Horizontal di⁄erentiation
We have so far assumed that hospitals di⁄er only in vertical quality in order to
focus on the e⁄ects of improved information on quality and to derive welfare
propositions. However, this simpli￿cation carries the cost that we have had
to ignore one obvious policy which achieves the ￿rst best: since quality has
a ￿xed cost independent of the number of patients served, the ￿rst best can
be achieved by closing the hospital with the highest cost of quality. The
obvious reason why hospital closure may not be welfare improving is that
the hospitals are also horizontally di⁄erentiated: perfectly informed patients
care about which hospital they use even if the quality of care is the same in
the two hospitals. We therefore now sketch a Hotelling type model (Brekke
et al 2006) with horizontal di⁄erentiation in which better information can
reduce equilibrium quality but closure of the hospital with the higher cost of
quality is not ￿rst best.
We extend our simple model of vertical quality di⁄erences to the case
where there are two types of patient. The ￿rst type have mass 1 and are
uniformly distributed at s 2 [0;1] along a road or product space with hospital
H located at s = 0 and L located at s = 1. A patient located at s has
perceived utility qH + "H ￿ ts from hospital H and qL + "L ￿ t(1 ￿ s) from
hospital L, where t > 0 is a travel cost parameter. We make the same
assumptions about the error distributions as before (section 2.1). The second
type of patient has a very high travel or mismatch parameter ￿ and mass
mL of them are located at s = 1. We can always ￿nd a su¢ ciently high ￿ so
that in equilibrium all of these patients will choose L (￿ > ￿q + 1
2v) and the
cost saving from shutting down L (q2
L￿L=2) is less than the loss in expected
utility (mL(￿ ￿ ￿q)) they would su⁄er from being forced to use hospital H.
Now consider the equilibrium, which is determined by competition for the
17patients who are uniformly distributed along the road and have transport cost
t < ￿. Each of these patients always prefers treatment to no treatment and
chooses hospital H if and only if qH + "H ￿ ts ￿ qL + "L ￿ t(1 ￿ s), or
￿q + t(1 ￿ 2s) ￿ "L ￿ "H,
We derive their demand functions by ￿rst calculating the demand by
patients located at s and then integrating these location speci￿c demands
over s 2 [0;1] to get demand for hospital H (and hence L) as a function
of the hospital qualities, distance cost parameter t, and the information
precision parameter v. There are three critical locations. All patients at s
will choose H if qH ￿ v￿1 ￿ ts ￿ qL + v￿1 ￿ t(1 ￿ s) or if
s ￿ s1 ￿
￿







and all will choose L if qH + v￿1 ￿ ts ￿ qL ￿ v￿1 ￿ t(1 ￿ s) or if
s > s3 ￿
￿







Finally, patients at s = s2 would be indi⁄erent between H and L if there
were no errors, where




Using the ￿rst two rows in Table 1, with qH￿ts and qL￿t(1￿s) (qualities
net of distance costs) replacing qH and qL, we have Table 2 which shows the
demand functions for patients (note that the order of the columns is reversed
compared with the Table 1.
Table 2. Demand for hospital H conditional on location s
s 2 [0; ^ s1] s 2 [^ s1; ^ s2] s 2 [^ s2; ^ s3] s 2 [^ s3;1]
DH1 DH2 DH3 DH4
1 1 ￿ v2
2
￿





￿q + t + 1
v ￿ 2st)
￿2 0
= 1 ￿ 2v2t2(￿s1 + s)2 = 2v2t2(s3 ￿ s)2
where ^ si = minfmaxf0;sig;1g, i = 1;2;3 and DHi(s;￿q) is the location



















All patients of the ￿rst type are treated and so DL = 1 ￿ DH + mL.
Depending on the parameters t;v and the quality di⁄erence ￿q, the
market for the ￿rst type of patient can have six con￿gurations: complete
18monopoly for H when s1 > 1, local monopoly for H when 0 < s1 < 1 < s3,
local monopolies for H and L when 0 < s1 < s3 < 1, full competition when
s1 < 0 < 1 < s3, local monopoly for L when s1 < 0 < s3 < 1, and complete
monopoly for L when s3 < 0.
Since the demand function depends on ￿q, we have, as in the simpler
model of earlier sections, DH
H = DL
L. Hence equilibria in which both hospitals
produce positive quality must satisfy the same conditions as in the simpler
model: interior pro￿t maximisation ￿H
H = 0 (6) and proportional equilibrium
qualities qH￿H ￿qL￿L = 0 (19).
The Nash Equilibria take di⁄erent forms depending on the equilibrium
market con￿guration. Establishing that a equilibrium with a particular mar-
ket con￿guration is proof against deviations by either ￿rm which alter ￿q and
hence may shift the market to another con￿guration requires much tedious
manipulation. We sketch two example equilibria.
If 0 < s1 and s3 < 1 then each hospital monopolises one section of the
market for the ￿rst type of patient. The demand function (38) simpli￿es to
D




Each hospital always gets half of the patients in the competitive segment
(s1;s3) since in this segment the di⁄erence in quality ￿q is on average o⁄set
by the distance cost and so patients￿choices are random. Increases in v
increase the monopoly segements, but do so at the same rate. Hence the
market share of ￿rms is una⁄ected by the uncertainty about quality. Since
the information parameter v has no e⁄ect on demand it has no e⁄ect on
￿rm￿ s choice of quality.
Proposition 5 If vt > 1 there exist equilibria in which improvements in
information have no e⁄ect on equilibrium quality.
Proof. (Sketch.) Suppose that ￿H = ￿L, then the equilibrium will have
￿q = 0. If ￿q = 0 then vt > 1 implies both 0 < s1 and s3 < 1 and so the
demand for both hospitals is una⁄ected by v.
The rationale for the condition vt > 1 is that with large v (little uncer-
tainty about quality) or large t(high distance costs) patients near a hospital
will not choose the alternative hospital even if they believe the nearest hos-
pital has lower quality. Any error in quality perception will be small and
the perceived quality di⁄erence will be insu¢ cient to outweigh the transport
costs.
In the second example, the ￿rms compete across the entire market for
the ￿rst type of patient (s1 < 0, s3 > 1) and we assume that the quality



























￿H￿L + v2(p ￿ c)(￿L ￿ ￿H)
(42)
which is the same as when there is no horizontal di⁄erentiation.
Di⁄erentiation of (41) or equivalenty of DH
H with respect to v shows that
an improvement in information (increase in v) increases or decreases equilib-
rium quality as
v




We must also check that the conditions s1 < 0, s2 > 1 are satis￿ed so the
demand function is (40). These conditions are satis￿ed if t < ￿q < 1
v ￿ t
where, from (19), ￿q = qH￿ = qH(￿L ￿ ￿H)=￿L. Thus we have
Proposition 6 An improvement in information will reduce vertical quality













Our results give some insights about how changes in information a⁄ect hos-
pital quality competition. We model patient information as an imperfect
signal about true hospital quality and focus on the precision of the signal as
a policy instrument. One contribution we make is highlighting the in￿ uence
of heterogeneous quality-production technologies. The model shows that
increasing information will increase hospital quality only if the level of infor-
mation is relatively low, and/or the hospitals have similar quality-producing
technologies. Furthermore, the level of information that maximises quality is
lower the higher is the gap between hospitals￿quality-producing technology.
Governments looking to encourage quality competition may hope to do so
by improving the information consumers have about hospital quality. How-
ever, our model suggests that governments must also ensure that hospitals
have relatively equal access to capital investment and labour markets for
management and doctors, represented in the model by ￿H and ￿L, if they
want to improve quality by improving information.
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22Appendix. Derivation of demand function
The line edb in Figure A1 plots "H ￿ "L = k where k < 0. The distance







, j = H;L. The distances 0a = 0c = 1
2v so that the area
of support is 1
v2. The integral over the support equals 1, so that the joint
density over the support is 1
v.
With the mass of patients equal to 1, the demand for hospital H is the
probabilty that patient chooses H:
D
H(qH;qL;v) = Pr(qH +"H ￿ qL +"L) = Pr("H ￿ "L ￿ qH ￿ qL) (A1)
When qH ￿ qL = k the probability that patient chooses H is the area def






df = cf ￿ cd = cf ￿ ce =
1
2v










Hence the probability that the patient chooses H when the quality gap qH ￿
qL = k is
D






















qH ￿ qL = k > 0 the probability that the patient chooses H is found by
subtracting the corresponding triangle (in the top left corner of the square
support) from the square and dividing by 1
v2 to get the expression in Table








Figure 1.  Demand for hospital H is the distribution function F(qH – qL) of the difference 
of two variates distributed uniformly on [-1/2v, 1/2v] 
 
 
Figure 2. Profit maximizing quality for hospital H.   
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Figure 6. Quality cost parameters and effect of information on quality 
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Figure 7.  Equilibria defined by intersection of ratio condition loci (H/L) and hospital L reaction functions 
L
a r .  Increase in information (v to v) increases quality when the quality cost differential is small (
L
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Figure 8.   Better information (increase in v) may increase or reduce hospital H marginal 
revenue and increase or reduce profit maximizing qH. depends on marginal cost of quality 
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Figure A1.  Support of jointly uniform error distribution and probability of choice 































HL k    
L   